So what constitutes effective leave strategy? Let us assume ourselves rational agents who seek to maximize our own utility – and in this particular case, our utility would mean comfort and relative freedom from tasking. Effective leave strategy in this sense would mean that we try to minimize our work done (by taking leave on high pressure days, etc), and maximize our leisure time within camp (by coming back during block leave).
Now I have a disclaimer for you: I do not encourage or endorse skiving, slacking off work, or taking leave on days where you are needed (i.e Parades, high-key dates…) . I am merely commenting on the nature of the situation. I only happen to be in this position of relative comfort because I have cleared my leave earlier. So encik, if you’re reading this, don’t scold me on Monday!
In case you are not sure of the armchair game theory / competitive strategy that I refer to in the title, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is defined as follows by econlib.org.
In the traditional version of the game, the police have arrested two suspects and are interrogating them in separate rooms. Each can either confess, thereby implicating the other, or keep silent. No matter what the other suspect does, each can improve his own position by confessing. If the other confesses, then one had better do the same to avoid the especially harsh sentence that awaits a recalcitrant holdout. If the other keeps silent, then one can obtain the favorable treatment accorded a state’s witness by confessing. Thus, confession is the dominant strategy for each. But when both confess, the outcome is worse for both than when both keep silent.
Now how does this apply to the culture of ‘Block Leave’ within the SAF?
If we are allowed to take Block Leave, in effect we are given an option to deviate from the ‘social good’ – the ‘non-confession strategy’. Block Leave only works in essence because we can come back to camp on days where it will be relatively less busy – due to there being less people – and not come back to camp on normal days, where there would (presumably) be more work to do, or to have to share the I-Net (haha). This derives from the assumption that we do not gain substantial satisfaction from our jobs as opposed to our free time – which I don’t think is a stretch. Hypothetically, if I come back on a block leave day, I have the relative freedom to go to the gym, or to SIB (cough, not that I ever do it), or to spend my time watching a movie or reading a book.
In essence, this means that the idea of block leave only works because everybody has agreed to not ‘cheat’ on the implicit contract made. If too many people come back during block leave, it no longer becomes a block leave day. It reminds me of the situation in the Armchair Economist where butchers banded together to restrict their own working hours by convincing the City Council to outlaw meat sales after 6.00 pm. In effect, they reduce the supply of butchery services as a cartel – mutually beneficial to the butchers as they don’t have to worry about others cheating on the agreement. This does not become a Prisoner’s Dilemma only because of legislation that prevents the butchers from cheating on their own agreement.
In that sense, another assumption comes into play – the idea that we have the autonomy to decide whether we want to take Block Leave. Officers in their first year do not have any days of leave because of the 2 weeks long break after OCS. Therefore they are excluded from enacting this ‘game’.
Similarly, men on the ground in conventional battalions (excluding the HQ) would presumably not be allowed to take leave whenever they like, with the exception of the lull period in December (I guess? I have no experience in a conventional Battalion.) Men on the ground within non-conventional Battalions such as my own do not have a culture of block leave at all due to the shift system, so that’s out.
Therefore; this would largely apply to the Battalion HQ, or Division HQ.
Hence, because we are allowed to take Block Leave on any day we want, at first you might be surprised that the outcome does not turn out as expected – i.e the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation, or the Tragedy of the Commons situation where everybody chooses to cheat on the agreement and not take leave during Block Leave.
But then again, I’m not surprised at all, when I think about it again.
Let’s speculate on some reasons why not many people choose to willingly ‘cheat’ on the established system of Block Leave within the SAF.
(1) They do not realize that for them, Block Leave may be optional. (I don’t think it is, really! Perhaps it’s just a function of privilege.)
(2) They do not see the economics of the situation.
(3) They are afraid of the consequences of not taking block leave. (Costs of cheating outweigh Benefits)
(4) They are not purely rational agents. Altruism and adhering to the contract may be more important to them than a small personal benefit of more time with their pillow.
(5) They derive satisfaction from interaction with others
(6) They have something to do on the Block Leave dates – perhaps even with the other NSFs / Regulars.
(7) They only clue in, in their second year 😉
In conclusion, I’d say that the system Block Leave still really models a Prisoner’s Dilemma, but the main reason why cooperation does not collapse is because people just don’t notice. I’m sure that if you go around telling people about this ‘effective leave strategy’, you’d start to hear a whole lot of “oh ya hor”. So I’ve put my time into writing this article to ponder about the situation. Let me know if you went “oh ya hor”, and thanks for serving 😉